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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to determine the understanding of government 
organizations as to their role regarding the security and privacy concerns raised by 
new technology development, with particular reference to comparisons in attitudes 
between Australia and France. Interviews were conducted with individuals from 
government or public sector organizations in each country with responsibilities for 
understanding the security and privacy issues as they relate to citizens. Findings of this 
work should have implications for national and international policy. 
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Introduction 
While new technology is marketed internationally and available relatively easily in any 
country, privacy and security concerns vary from culture to culture as they are often 
tied to the tradition of the place and the restrictions brought to bear by the governing 
bodies. This situation raises the following question: to what extent do cultural attitudes 
towards privacy and security affect the take-up and use of new information 
technologies? 
In this context, the objectives of the current work are to determine the key points of 
difference and of similarity in such attitudes in two geographically quite distinct parts 
of the world. France and Australia are developed nations with different histories and 
cultures, resulting in distinct approaches to security and privacy issues and laws by 
citizens, governments and industries. Both countries have invested heavily in 
information and communication technology development. However, neither country 
has undertaken an in-depth analysis of the impact of security and privacy attitudes on 
the up-take of these technologies. 
The research objectives of the current work are to assist in filling this gap by: 
Determining the key points of difference and of similarity in the roles played by 
governments and public sector organizations in France and Australia in the 
development of policy dealing with security and privacy concerns raised by new 
technology developments. 
While many research projects, company and government reports have provided a 
technical vision of security and privacy (McCarthy & Fonseca 2003, Riguidel et al.a 
2005, Cordis 2006), they have rarely taken into account the social aspects and impacts 
of digital technologies as they relate to security and privacy, thus the current work 
breaks new ground in this area. Initial work on these objectives was reported in (Batten 
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& LeGrand 2006). One of the key findings from that study, which comprised a series 
of interviews with companies selling security and privacy products il1 both countries, 
was: 
People are willing to accept a loss of privacy for the sake of convenience. Therefore, 
major new technological systems need to be linked to both legislation and policy, and 
appropriate controls put in place. 
The companies producing the technologies sometimes realize the implications for 
security and privacy that these technologies hold, yet they are driven by commercial 
ends and are not obliged by law to inform the customer of the impact of the technology 
uptake. The above recommendation would encourage the involvement of government 
in determining appropriate policy around such technologies. 
In order to follow up on this issue, the authors approached several government, 
national and international organizations with responsibilities for policy and legislation 
to determine their view of their responsibilities in influencing or introducing 
regulation. In the current paper, we report on discussions with these organizations, both 
in France and in Australia, and summarize our findings in the conclusion. 
Background 
Information technologies have altered the way individuals, businesses and societies 
live and operate. Increased speed, greater access, extended flexibility have all been 
outcomes of the latest technological (Mansell 2005). Hand in hand with these changes 
have appeared a loss of privacy along with threats to the security of confidential 
information (Riguidel et al.b 2004). 'It is now widely accepted in the social sciences 
that there is an inter-relationship between technology, society and culture. Users shape 
the technologies as much as they are shaped by them. However, much of the policy and 
technological discussion continues to have the flavour of a one-way relationship - that 
of the impact of technology on society.' (Beaton & Wajcman 2004) 
Trust is an issue that is often raised in discussions of privacy and security issues in 
technologies. Yang (Yang 2005) points out that trust is an important dimension of 
social capital as it is essential in relationship building. In both France and Australia, 
studies (Farquharson & Chritchley 2004, LeGrand et al. 2006) have shown that most 
people are trusting of small business and of public organizations such as hospitals and 
universities. They do not trust governments, major companies, trade unions or the 
media. 
In a 2003/2004 survey (Farquharson & Chritchley 2004) of the attitudes of Australians 
to new technologies, the authors conclude that: 
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• Trust in government, business and media predicts levels of comfort with new 
technologies. 
In (Rose 2005), Rose examines the concerns around information privacy in New 
Zealand where she determines that the greatest concern was for unauthorized access to 
data. She goes on to point out that individual controls (eg. choice, correction) are 
necessary to ensure a normative right to privacy but that these need to be 
complemented by external controls such as a privacy law; in addition, education of the 
public about the mechanisms in place is a critical part of the implementation of privacy 
rights and legislation. 
As pointed out in (Batten & LeGrand 2006), "In 1998, Alain Weber, President of the 
Computer and Freedom Commission of the Human Rights League, France, stated 
(www.delis.sgdg.org/menuJ25avri1l2504aw.htm) that governments should never be trusted 
concerning the use of new technologies, which are always used by them for more and 
better surveillance. He goes on to say that citizens are not aware of the dangers of 
rampant technology development. Moreover, several organizations such as Federation 
Informatique et Libertes (http://www.vie-privee.org) condemn the intrusion of 
governments in daily life and try to preserve the privacy the citizen obtained with the 
1978 law on computing and freedom (informatique et libertes), which later inspired 
work of the European Commission. Despite the fact that changes to this law must be 
approved by the Commission N ationale Informatique et Libertes, and are lengthy and 
difficult, by 2004 we see a marked diminution of the privacy rights of French citizens." 
Previous work of the authors (Batten & LeGrand 2006) indicates that "for companies 
dealing specifically in security products, the selling of security is a challenge. Security 
is viewed as necessary only when deemed so because of regulation or liability. The 
marketing of information security has always been, and continues to be, a problem, 
though with additional governmental requirements in the last few years, it is becoming 
easier to sell." Thus, on the one hand, we have a strong empathy emerging between 
governments and the technology vendors, and on the other, organizations with the 
mandate to protect the rights to privacy of citizens. 
Methodology 
As a result of our work in (Batten & LeGrand), the authors developed a short list of 
questions around which to focus discussion with government and public sector 
representatives, including those specifically charged with privacy portfolios, in order to 
address some of the issues raised. 
It was additionally noted that people are willing to accept a loss of privacy for the sake 
of convenience. One way to ensure that the conveniency aspects of new technologies 
does not wear away at privacy expectations is to link major new systems to both 
legislation and policy and to put in appropriate controls. The questions for discussion 
were therefore: 
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a) What role does government play relative to security and privacy issues 
developing around new technologies? 
b) How does policy and legislation evolve in the context of security and privacy 
issues developing around new technologies? 
And the research team's focus in addition to this was: 
c) What are the critical differences between France and Australia vis-a-vis the 
above points? 
Question (c) was aimed at a determination of the depth of understanding of 
comparative differences between Europe and Australasia; we were pleased at the 
extensive knowledge of some of the respondents in this regard. 
Because of their roles in public office, some of those interviewed asked us to specify 
them by name and we have done so. A number of discussions also took place with 
individuals in both countries who preferred not to be named. 
AUSTRALIA 
Paul Chadwick, Privacy Commissioner of Victoria, Australia 
Joseph Di Gregorio, a/g GM, Strategy Branch, Information Economy, Department of 
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA), Government of 
Australia 
FRANCE 
Fran~ois Giquel, Vice-President of Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des 
Libertes (CNIL), Paris, France 
Economic Analysis and Statistics Division, Directorate for Science, Technology and 
Industry, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), La 
Defense, Paris, France 
Discussions took place in either English or French as determined by the participants. 
The responses have been abbreviated into three general areas of questioning as 
delineated in the next section. 
Findings 
On the French side 
In France, the authors spoke with CNIL, in order to understand how France as a nation 
dealt with security and privacy issues around technology, and also with the OECD to 
gain a broader perspective of the situation leading to an understanding of international 
interactions in resolving issues. 
La Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertes, CNIL, is an administrative 
body established in 1978 by new laws relating to technology and freedom of the 
individual. CNIL works independently of government in France, but has formal 
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representation on several high level bodies including parliament and the Senate. 
CNIL's primary responsibility is the protection of personal data (from their collection, 
to their transportation and conservation) whenever digital techniques are being used 
(biometrics, video-surveillance, computer technology). There is ambiguity of 
responsibilities in some areas; for instance video-surveillance of public places in 
France is covered by a law of 1995 which in part excludes CNIL. 
The Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy of the OECD 
has four working parties, one of which looks at information economy issues and 
another looking at security and privacy. The Information Economy unit examines the 
economic and social implications of the development, diffusion and use oflCTs, the 
Internet and e-business. It analyses ICT policy frameworks shaping economic growth, 
productivity, employment and business performance. In particular, the Working Party 
on the Information Economy focuses on digital content, ICT diffusion to business, 
global value chains, ICT -enabled off-shoring, ICT skills and employment and the 
publication of the OECD Information Technology Outlook. The OECD Working Party 
on Information Security and Privacy develops policy options to sustain trust, 
information security and privacy in the global networked society. 
Q. Are you monitoring the impact of new technologies? 
Definitely. For CNIL, the type of data assimilated plays an extraordinarily important 
role. For instance, biometric data carries an inherent traceability potential. CNIL is not 
opposed to the use of biometric data for identification, but would argue for complete, 
secure control of the information by the owner-user. For instance, the information 
might be on a smart-card held by the user. In case there is a risk of miss-use of 
biometric data, for example, where it was introduced for the purpose of identification 
and then used for another purpose, such as tracking, CNIL is vehemently opposed. 
In this regard, a major impending risk seen by CNIL is the proliferation of databases 
which are interconnected. 
Q. Whose responsibility is it to educate on privacy and security issues? 
Both the OECD and CNIL accept responsibility for education on privacy and security. 
In determining metrics to use in measuring government's involvement in security and 
privacy, the OECD pointed out that there are problematic, and as yet unresolved, issues 
around defining the units for collection: what factors to include and how to get 
comparable readings across different countries where responsibilities may lie with 
either government or the private sector depending on the country, as well as 
confidentiality concerns. APEC is, however, keen to work with the OECD in 
developing a model survey for data collection. 
The OECD is about sharing best practice, and so they can be helpful to ministries of 
communications and other groups who come for assistance. Peak or widely 
representative bodies are often included in discussions on security and privacy. 
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In addition to their counselling role, CNIL provides a complaint service to citizens 
enabling them to determine if specific documents are respecting the laws on 
technology and freedom. CNIL can equally exercise their power of control of sensitive 
databases such as files regarding claimed infractions by the national police. 
Q. What is the impact on policy and legislation? 
CNIL does not strictly speaking initiate legal projects, but it is consulted on every 
project related to the protection of the individual when this is connected with 
automated data handling. In this case, CNIL will provide an opinion which will be 
taken into account in the discussion or in parliamentary debate. CNIL has several 
levels of sanctions at its disposal, including warnings and financial penalties, and can 
influence a court based on its power of persuasion and moral influence. The potential 
impact on the public image of a business often plays a far greater role in the outcome 
than the implementation of sanctions. 
From the perspective of the OECD, policy change is usually initiated at a specific 
country level, and when or if it arrives at the OECD, an attempt to gain consensus on it 
is made. The OECD might recommend that research and development be undertaken in 
a specific area, but it would never recommend a specific tool. 
On the Australian side 
In Australia, the authors talked to relevant players at the state level (in Victoria) and at 
the national level. 
Australia has a Commonwealth Privacy Commissioner mandated to oversee 
immigration, tax, and welfare in the commonwealth public sector. The federal 
commissioner deals with the corporate sector; state privacy commissioners do not. The 
office of the federal Privacy Commissioner, created in 1989, is independent of 
government but has responsibilities under the federal Privacy Act of 1988. The 
Jurisdiction of the Privacy Commissioner of Victoria (and of other states) is limited to 
state and local government. Australia has introduced state level offices of privacy 
commissioners over the last five to seven years. 
Several departments at the federal level, such as DCIT A have responsibility for the IT 
area and associated concerns such as security and privacy. These departments work 
with organizations in other countries as well as trans-national ones such as the OECD, 
along with national groups such as the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission and the Institute for the Certification of Computing Professionals and 
with the state governments. 
The office of Chief Information Officer in Victoria, Australia, has been in place since 
2004. It oversees the use of information technology by all government departments in 
the State. The office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner has particular 
responsibility for privacy of information. At the national level, the role of the Chief 
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Information Officer for AGIMO, the Australian Government Information Management 
Office, is to foster the efficient and effective use of ICT by Australian Government 
departments and agencies. AGIMO also works with governments and other bodies at 
the local, state, national and international levels to develop Australia's position as a 
world leader in e-government. 
The federal government has strong mandates for security in such areas as foreign 
affairs, messaging and data centres. Its Department of Defence has developed an 
extensive manual delineating appropriate communication security practices internal to 
the federal government (http://www.dsd.gov.au/library/infosec/acsi33.html). 
Q. Are you monitoring the impact of new technologies? 
DCIT A has responsibilities in policy development for key agencies, standards, e-
payments, e-research agendas, venture capitals and benchmarking research. It does 
international work with the 
OECD in developing risk assessment methodologies, and identifying new markets and 
services, determining who the providers are and how consumers engage. 
Statutory functions of the Privacy Commissioner of Victoria include independent audit 
and monitoring of data. The websites of the Victorian Government are audited every 
two years to check if they are privacy compliant. 
Data matching is a maj or threat depending on how it is done. Privacy is threatened 
when technologies for looking (eg. surveillance) are combined with technologies for 
remembering (eg. data matching). Examples are facial recognition and automated 
vehicle registration plate recognition technologies. 
The brief of a Privacy Commissioner is to regulate government. Governments always 
try to invade privacy because governments believe they have: 
• the mandate to survey 
• legitimate reasons to gather personal data (taxation, maintenance of borders). 
Governments are good customers for people who sell privacy-invasive technologies; 
they can impose surveillance by law and can determine the degree of their 
accountability . 
The Privacy Commissioner's job is partly to explain authorised compromises between 
competing interests - for example, privacy versus surveillance. Transparency in the 
handling of information is required and it is a constant bargain between the citizen and 
the State. The use of the word 'transparent' in The Act is part of the balance. The 
government needs to be transparent about collection, purpose and use of data. Many 
questions have to be raised in each context: Do we give people notice that they are 
being watched? What is the accountability of people who have access to this data? Is 
there an economic reason for keeping the data? Is there a law enforcement rationale? 
215 
Recent advances in security technology 
Privacy is well covered at the national level through the privacy act. Banks are self-
governing and follow their own code of practice; this allows them to control their 
costs. Identity crime is also well covered through the Act. Documents and proofs are 
still quite weak. This has two sides: identity fraud and collection of taxes and fines. 
Today, it is very difficult to track where people actually live and some use the system 
to avoid paying tax. 
Governments have moved closer to the security end than to the privacy end of the 
spectrum, especially since 9/1112001. However, citizens tend to trust that technology 
will not be misused and the new generation seems to have higher thresholds for privacy 
issues because of their familiarity with technologies. 
Q. Whose responsibility is it to educate on privacy and security issues? 
People are not aware of the issues. However, awareness-raising is the responsibility of 
the people who provide services on the internet. 
Also, there are big initiatives starting from the government level. Two levels can be 
distinguished: the home which is uncontrolled and the government which can be 
controlled. But nobody in government mandates what others are running. Therefore, 
there will probably be a new generation of contracts for security with large companies 
including audit and penalty clauses. Penalties will be used as a big stick but we will 
certainly prefer to use governance. 
Education is also the responsibility of the home and then of the education system. 
Privacy commissioners have a role. Makers of products should also educate in 
indicating how to tum off features on their devices (e.g. how to cut offRFID tags, 
point out that you have a GPS device that can be used for tracking purposes etc.) We 
are in an age comparable to the industrial revolution when safe practices in the 
workplace were unknown and developed slowly over time. We have to develop safe 
practices for the information age. 
The core role of DCIT A is information awareness. The weak points in reality are 
consumer awareness and practice. Greater skills, better data management and an 
understanding of secure networks are needed by consumers. With the convergence of 
many new technologies, things are blurring and it is difficult to make decisions. The 
workplace is a catalyst. People are comforted by 'protection' of systems there and feel 
that they can operate in the same way in other, less well-protected, locations. 
Governments should raise awareness universally but it is also the role of large players 
such as banks, states and consumers as e-health and e-education become more and 
more prevalent. It is a key societal issue. DCIT A weighs legislation against education 
and takes the latter road. Its role is to educate government, large business, small and 
medium business, and the consumer. 
The OECD and also APEC provide guidelines and raise awareness, but they cannot 
legislate. 
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Since 1996, the OECD has been developing surveys and key performance indicators 
for benchmarking and has frameworks to evaluate programs. The Australian 
population census is one of the first in the world to include questions on internet use. 
The major issues for the near future include: 
• the justice field (justice is a key role of government); information will be used 
to shame and punish but the debate on this is yet to be heard. 
• What should be done with DNA since DNA contains personal data? DNA 
indicates paternity, ethnic typing, and one person's data is related to that of 
their blood relatives too. There are huge issues in this field. 
Elected representatives as much as appointed officials have a duty to take a greater 
interest and to generate deep public discussion. Currently, such discussions are at a 
primitive level. 
Q. What is the impact on policy and legislation? 
Most of the problems encountered are procedural problems, therefore there is an urgent 
need to improve policy and this is why the Law Enforcement Assistance Program 
system examines privacy exposures at the State level. The Australian national Audit 
Office report contains information on security and privacy around several governments 
at state and local levels. The Australian Government Information and Communications 
Technology Security Manual, developed by the Defense Signals Directorate (DSD), 
provides policies and guidance to Australian Government agencies on how to protect 
their ICT systems: The federal government has stronger mandates around security. It 
has heavy mandates for instance in foreign affairs, messaging, data centres, etc. 
DCITA works with ACMA (the Australian Communications & Media Authority). 
There, they have a role in guiding policies and joint response with other agencies. They 
promote e-payment standards including issues of interoperability and accreditation. 
(Small and medium business need to be convinced that the cost of becoming standards 
and secure service compliant is not prohibitive.) 
Conclusions 
In responding to the key queries of this research undertaking, the following points arise 
from the previous section. 
a. What role does government play relative to security and privacy issues developing 
around new technologies? 
Governments in both France and Australia are attempting to take a lead in the 
deployment of new technologies and in doing so in a considered fashion with 
appropriate risk analysis and monitoring activities. 
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Governments in both countries believe they have a role in the education process, but 
that they are not the only parties with this responsibility. Other groups ,identified as 
being equally responsible are technology providers, users and professional educators, 
and some large players such as financial organizations. 
Government also believes that it has a mandate to gather data on technology use and to 
audit and monitor this use. 
b. How does policy and legislation evolve in the context a/security and privacy issues 
developing around new technologies? 
Both countries recognize that private individuals are not aware of all the implications 
of the use of new technologies, and that policy and legislation need to be developed to 
protect them. Government also believes that it has a mandate to verify government 
department compliance with policy. A tension between conflicting roles of government 
was identified: the fact that government has a mandate to survey a population, 
alongside legitimate reasons to gather personal data (taxation, maintenance of borders, 
etc.). 
c. What are the critical differences between France and Australia vis-a-vis the above 
points? 
France is more advanced than Australia in the area of privacy protection. CNIL plays a 
very strong role in France backed by its membership of key parliamentary and judicial 
courts. However, privacy commissioners in Australia are developing a solid network 
both within Australia and internationally and are establishing themselves as important 
players in the arena. 
Australia has defined a detailed and comprehensive set of requirements for information 
security (http://www.dsd.gov.au/library/infosec/acsi33.html) as it is to be implemented 
at the federal level. France has less structured guidelines, but encourages self-
regulation of key players through documents such as 
http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.frIBRP/98400 lS19/0000.rtf which provides 
a set of case studies of the Conseil d"Etat. 
The French government also provides educational resources for citizens through sites 
such as 
http://www .minefi.gouv .ft/ dgccrf/04 _ dossiers/consommationl guide/guide _ comm _elect 
ron _.pdf and http://internet.gouv.fr. These sites aim to educate generally about the 
issues surrounding new technologies. On the other hand, Australian government has 
concentrated on providing information about government practices and information of 
use to small and medium business on sites such as http://www.agimo.gov.au/practice 
and http://www.agimo.gov.au/information. 
Out of the discussions, some major issues were identified for future attention, including 
the use of large interactive databases, the use of information as a means of shaming and 
punishment, and the introduction of DNA as a form of identification. No single entity 
accepts (full) responsibility for the monitoring of and response to these issues. 
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